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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Dustin Thomas Armstrong appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conditional guilty plea to grand theft, claiming the district court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
On February 23, 2013, Jean Boyer called the nonemergency dispatch line to 
request a police officer's assistance. Ms. Boyer reported that her adult son, Armstrong, 
lived with her and had come into the house that morning and asked her if she had 
"some accounts with money in it, and he knew that they were for him." (Tr., p.28, L.24 -
p.30, L.17.) Ms. Boyer told Armstrong that there were no accounts and no money, and 
he responded, "That's fine. I'll have my attorney take care of it." (Tr., p.30, Ls.18-21.) 
Ms. Boyer told her son to "pack [his] stuff and leave[,]" knowing that he was high on 
methamphetamine because she had seen similar behavior when he was on 
methamphetamine in the past. (Tr., p.30, Ls.22-25; p.34, L.14 - p.35, L.4.) Ms. Boyer 
went into her office and as she sat at her computer, Armstrong entered the room and 
told her, "I just want you to know, Mom, when I turn 39, I will have family benefits on my 
dead mom." (Tr., p.31, Ls.1-5.) Ms. Boyer told Armstrong, "I'm not dead yet, and I'm 
not staying here[,]" then she went to her sister's residence and called the 
nonemergency police officer because she "wasn't going back until someone showed up 
there." (Tr., p.31, Ls.6-10.) Later that day, Ms. Boyer received a phone call from a 
1 
female Boise police officer, 1 and informed the officer about the statements Armstrong 
made to her that morning, and that she assumed Armstrong was using 
meihamphetamine. (Tr., p.32, L.1 - p.33, L.4.) 
Boise City Police Officer Mattie Chally responded to Ms. Boyer's "narcotics call" 
and, prior to locating Armstrong, she verified he was on felony probation or parole. (Tr., 
p.47, L.3 - p.48, L.3.) Officer Chally spotted Armstrong's vehicle, which was the only 
vehicle parked in a credit union parking lot, and requested the assistance of other 
officers to enter the credit union and contact Armstrong. (Tr., p.49, L.12 - p.50, L.3.) As 
requested, two officers went into the credit union, and after Armstrong identified himself, 
they told him to complete his business and they would talk to him outside. (Tr., p.57, 
L.25 - p.58, L.19.) 
Officer Chally talked to the on-call probation and parole officer, Laila Jeffries, 
who, after confirming Armstrong was a parolee, requested that the police officers 
conduct a K-9 search of his vehicle for her.2 (Tr., p.37, L.14 - p.39, L.19; p.44, Ls.14-16 
("Can you please search with the K9 unit for me."); p.50, L.23 - p.51, L.10.) Condition 
Number 8 of Armstrong's signed conditions of parole stated, "Parolee will submit to a 
search of person or property, to include residence and vehicle, at any time and place by 
1 It appears that the female Boise City Police Officer Ms. Boyer spoke to was Officer 
Chally. (See Tr., p.47, L.22 - p.48, L.3 (Officer Chally testified that she confirmed 
Armstrong's parole status before she "made contact with Mr. Armstrong or the calling 
party.").) 
2 Neither Parole Officer Jeffries, nor any other Probation and Parole officer, were 
present when the K-9 team searched Armstrong's car. (Tr., p.44, Ls.12-22.) 
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any agent of Field and Community Services and s/he does waive constitutional right to 
be free from such searches." (St. Ex. 1; Tr., p.25, L.2 - p.26, L.13.) 
Officer Jerry Walbey, a certified K-9 handler with the Garden City Police 
Department, went to the credit union and conducted a K-9 search of the exterior, then 
the interior, of Armstrong's vehicle. (Tr., p.88, L.22 - p.90, L.10.) The K-9 alerted on a 
safe that was behind the driver's seat. (Tr., p.89, Ls.20-24.) Officer Walbey turned the 
safe over to Officer Chally, who was given a key by Ms. Boyer which opened the safe. 
(Tr., p.52, L.5 - p.53, L.5; p.90, Ls.17-19; p.94, L.4 - p.95, L.2.) The safe was owned by 
Ms. Boyer. (Tr., p.93, Ls19-23.) Inside the safe, officers found Ms. Boyer's personal 
identifying information, financial documentation, and a checkbook belonging to her. 
(Prelim. Tr., p.9, L.25 - p.10, L.16.) 
The state charged Armstrong with grand theft for the wrongful taking, obtaining 
and/or withholding "a safe containing a checkbook and/or financial documents from the 
owner, Jean Boyer .... " (R., pp.37-38.) Armstrong filed a Motion to Suppress, seeking 
to suppress all evidence seized as a result of his detention and subsequent search of 
his vehicle without a warrant. (R., pp.54-55.) Armstrong later filed an Amended Motion 
to Suppress, additionally seeking to suppress all statements, admissions, and 
confessions he may have made prior to being given his Miranda warnings. (R., pp.63-
64.) 
After a suppression hearing, the district court granted Armstrong's motion to 
suppress the physical evidence on the basis that Condition Number 8 of Armstrong's 
parole agreement waived his right to be free from searches conducted by agents of 
Field and Community Services, and the police officers who searched Armstrong's 
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vehicle were not agents of Field and Community Services. 3 (Tr., p.121, L.12- p.122, 
L.20.) The court also suppressed all statements Armstrong made to law enforcement 
that were the result of the discovery of the safe, on the basis that such statements were 
"fruit of the poisonous tree." (Tr., p.126, Ls.6-24.) 
The state filed a Motion to Reconsider and a supporting brief (R., pp.93-94, 96-
105), and Armstrong filed a brief in response (R., pp.106-108). The district court 
subsequently entered an Order Granting State's Motion to Reconsider Ruling and 
Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence, concluding, under the dictionary 
definition of the word "agent," the police officers who conducted the search of 
Armstrong's vehicle at the request of Parole Officer Jeffries were, in fact, acting as 
agents of Field and Community Services. (R., pp.109-118.) The district court denied 
Armstrong's motion to suppress the physical evidence -- namely, the safe and its 
contents -- seized during the search of his vehicle. (Id.) Given its revised ruling that the 
police officers were agents of Parole Officer Jeffries, the court also denied Armstrong's 
motion to suppress statements he made to police officers. (Id.) 
Armstrong subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to grand theft, reserving 
the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. (R., pp.125-129.) The court 
3 The district court's decision to suppress the physical evidence seized from 
Armstrong's car appears to be based on the court's recall of Officer Jeffries' testimony 
"that Boise City police officers are not agents of Field and Community Services." (Tr., 
p.121, L.23 - p.122, L.1.) When asked by the prosecutor what she meant when she 
said that, Officer Jeffries explained, "They're not part of Idaho Department of 
Corrections," and added that, in the course of her employment, she uses them to help 
her do things such as vehicle searches, and regularly asks other agencies in the area to 
conduct those searches. (Tr., p.42, L.5 - p.43, L.6.) 
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imposed a unified three-year sentence, with one year fixed, and Armstrong timely 
appealed. (R., pp.134-141.) 
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ISSUE 
Armstrong states the issue on appeal as: 
In light of the fact that article X, section 5 of the Idaho Constitution 
specifically places the duty of control, direction, and management of 
parole on the Board of Corrections, did the district court err when it 
determined that an on-call probation and parole officer can delegate 
that constitutional duty to local police, thereby making them agents of 
the Board? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Armstrong failed to establish error in the denial of his suppression motion? 
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ARGUMENT 
Armstrong Has Failed To Establish Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion 
A. Introduction 
Armstrong argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress 
because (1) under article X, § 5 of the Idaho Constitution, Parole Officer Jeffries had no 
authority to delegate her supervision duties to local police officers to search Armstrong's 
vehicle without a warrant, and (2) the conditions of parole signed by Armstrong only 
allowed "actual agents" of Field and Community Services to conduct a warrantless 
search of Armstrong's vehicle. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-14.) Armstrong's arguments fail 
for several reasons. 
First, Armstrong's argument on appeal is predicated on his contention that his 
Parole Officer Jeffries could not request police officers to act as her agent because 
article X, § 5 of the Idaho Constitution precludes such a "delegation" of her duties. 
Because Armstrong did not present that argument to the district court, he has failed to 
preserve it for appeal. Even if Armstrong's argument is considered, article X, § 5 of the 
Idaho Constitution is irrelevant in determining whether the search of Armstrong's vehicle 
violated his constitutional rights. Next, under the plain meaning of Armstrong's 
conditions of parole, police officers were agents of the parole officer, and were entitled 
to act on her behalf by searching Armstrong's vehicle. Finally, even without any 
conditions of parole, the search of Armstrong's vehicle was reasonable because, as a 
parolee, he had a lessened expectation of privacy. 
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Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the 
application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 
160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). 
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law over 
which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 
798,102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004). 
C. Insofar As Armstrong's !ssue Is Based On Article X, § 5 Of The Idaho 
Constitution, It Was Not Preserved For Appeal And Otherwise Fails On The 
Merits 
It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must 
be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal. State v. 
Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 885, 119 P.3d 653, 660 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. 
Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000)). Moreover, I.RE. 
103(a)(1) requires "a party opposing proffered evidence" to "make a timely objection 
stating the specific ground of objection unless the specific ground is apparent from the 
context." kl "An objection on one ground will not preserve a separate and different 
basis for excluding the evidence." Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho at 885, 119 P.3d at 660 
(citing State v. Norton, 134 Idaho 875, 880, 11 P.3d 494, 499 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. 
Enyeart, 123 Idaho 452, 454, 849 P.2d 125, 127 (Ct. App. 1993)); State v. Holland, 135 
Idaho 159, 161-162, 15 P.3d 1167, 1169-1170 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a defendant 
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has the burden to present grounds for his motion to suppress to the trial court, and may 
not raise alternative suppression grounds for the first time on appeal.) 
On appeal, Armstrong argues that his Parole Officer Jeffries did not have 
authority to utilize Boise City police officers as her agents to conduct a search of 
Armstrong's vehicle. Armstrong's argument is based on article X, § 5 of the Idaho 
Constitution, which, he contends, precludes the parole officers from utilizing police 
officers as their agents because they are not allowed to delegate their duties: 
The district court found that Boise police officers were such agents 
because a probation and parole officer authorized them to search Mr. 
Armstrong's car. However, this finding presupposed that a probation and 
parole officer has the authority to delegate the responsibility of searching a 
parolee. The Idaho constitution places the duty to control, direct, and 
manage parole on the Board of Corrections [sic]. . .. Because the 
probation and parole officer did not have the authority to delegate the 
constitutional duty to another entity, the Boise police were not agents 
falling within the scope of Mr. Armstrong's waiver. 
The district court denied Mr. Armstrong's motion to suppress 
finding, "[t]he parole agent in this case authorized Boise City Police 
Officers to act in her place in conducting a search of the Defendant's 
vehicle. This is the very definition of an agent." (R., pp.116-117.) At the 
heart of this ruling, and what it presupposes, is that Ms. Jeffries, a 
probation and parole officer, had the authority to delegate the Board of 
Correction's constitutional duty to control, direct, and manage parole to 
another entity. Because Ms. Jeffries did not have that authority, the 
district court erred in finding that Boise police officers were agents of Field 
and Community Services and authorized to search under the terms of Mr. 
Armstrong's waiver. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.7-8.) 
However, in the district court, Armstrong did not argue that article X, § 5 of the 
Idaho Constitution ipso facto prevented the parole officer from allowing law enforcement 
officers from other agencies to act as her agent. In fact, article X, § 5 of the Idaho 
Constitution was not mentioned in the district court, either in court or in the pleadings 
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and briefs. (See generally R., pp.54-55, 63-64, 65-68, 71-78, 84-88, 96-108; Tr., pp.6-
130.) Rather, the sole question presented by Armstrong in the lower court was whether 
term "agent" in paragraph 8 of the conditions of parole (St. Ex. 1, p.2) included only 
personnel of Field and Community Services, or, as the state contended, any law 
enforcement officer acting at the behest of a parole officer. Because Armstrong did not 
argue in the district court what he now argues on appeal, he has failed to preserve this 
issue, and this Court should not consider it. 
Moreover, article X, § 5 of the Idaho Constitution is irrelevant in determining 
whether the search of Armstrong's vehicle violated his constitutional rights; it reads: 
State prisons -- Control over. -- The state legislature shall 
establish a nonpartisan board to be known as the state board of 
correction, and to consist of three members appointed by the governor, 
one member for two years, one member for four years, and one member 
for six years. After the appointment of the first board the term of each 
member appointed shall be six years. This board shall have the control, 
direction and management of the penitentiaries of the state, their 
employees and properties, and of adult felony probation and parole, with 
such compensation, powers, and duties as may be prescribed by law. 
Nothing in article X, § 5 of the Idaho Constitution precludes parole officers from using 
law enforcement officers from other agencies as "agents" to assist in the performance of 
a parole officer's duties. 
Armstrong's theory that article X, § 5 of the Idaho Constitution establishes a non-
delegable set of duties that the Board of Correction (and presumably, its employees) 
cannot ask others to assist in as agents is meritless -- none of the cases cited by 
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Armstrong hold as much.4 (See Appellant's Brief, pp.7-14.) Even if the overall "control, 
direction and management" of parole are non-delegable duties of the Board of 
Correction, it does not mean that a parole officer -- acting under the control, direction 
and management of the Board -- cannot enlist the assistance of a police officer to act as 
her agent in fulfilling her duties. See Beitzel v. Coeur d'Alene, 121 Idaho 709, 713, 827 
P.2d 1160, 1164 (1991) ("Where a city has a nondelegable duty, the city may be liable 
not only for its own negligence in failing to carry out the duty, but also for the failure of 
others whom the city has authorized to carry out it's [sic] duty."); Herbst v. Bothof 
Dairies, Inc., 110 Idaho 971, 974, 719 P.2d 1231, 1234 (Ct. App. 1986) ("a principal 
may be directly liable for harm that occurs when an agent performs a nondelegable task 
that the 'principal Is under a duty to perform with care"') (quoting Second Restatement§ 
251 (a) (1958)). Conversely, a police officer does not assume "the control, direction and 
management" of parole by merely conducting a search of a parolee's vehicle at a parole 
officer's request. Armstrong has failed to show any error in the district court's denial of 
his suppression motion. 
4 Armstrong quotes Mellinger v. State Dept of Corrections, 114 Idaho 494, 499, 757 
P.2d 1213, 1218 (Ct. App. 1988), as stating, "'The enabling acts of the legislature 
involved no delegation of authority[.]"' (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) However, in referring to 
the Board of Correction and the Commission of Pardons and Parole, the Mellinger 
decision states, "The enabling acts of the Legislature involved no delegation of 
legislative authority to either body." Mellinger, 114 Idaho at 499, 757 P.2d at 1218 
(emphasis added). 
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D. Armstrong Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His 
Suppression Motion By Determining That The Vehicle Search Was Permissible 
As A Condition Of Parole 
Armstrong argues that because his waiver "only encompassed actual agents of 
Field and Community Services, the warrantless search violated [his] constitutional rights 
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures" under the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. (Appellant's 
Brief, p.13 (capitalization and punctuation modified).) Armstrong adds that his waiver 
"was limited to searches conducted by agents of Field and Community Services[,]" and 
"[a]s argued above, the Boise police officers were not such agents."5 (Id.) 
The district court ruled that the police officers who conducted the search of 
Armstrong's vehicle at Parole Officer Jeffries' request, were, in fact, acting as her 
agents. The court explained: 
The parole-agreement waiver in this case stated: 
Parolee will submit to a search of person or property, to 
include residence and vehicle, at any time and place by any 
agent of Field and Community Services ands/he does waive 
constitutional right to be free from such searches. 
Defendant agreed to this term of the parole-agreement. Defendant 
agreed that he had no Fourth Amendment right to be free from a search 
"by any agent of Field and Community Services." Because this waiver 
was valid, the only question for the Court is whether the Boise City Police 
Officers who conducted the search were acting as agents of Field and 
5 The state assumes Armstrong is arguing that paragraph 8 of his conditions of parole 
(St. Ex. 1, p.2) precluded anyone other than Field and Community Services personnel 
from searching his car. However, it appears possible Armstrong is completing the 
argument that is founded on the idea that article X, § 5 of the Idaho Constitution 
precludes unrelated law enforcement officers from ever acting as agents of a parole 
officer. In the latter event, the state relies on its prior arguments concerning that state 
constitutional provision. 
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Community Services when they conducted the search. The Court finds 
that, as a matter of law, they were. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines agent as "[o]ne who is authorized to 
act for or in place of another; a representative." Black's Law Dictionary 9th 
ed. (2009). The parole agent in this case authorized Boise City Police 
Officers to act in her place in conducting a search of the Defendant's 
vehicle. This is the very definition of an agent. The fact that the parole 
officer did not personally attend the search is of no constitutional 
consequence. Cf United States v. Richardson, 849 F.2d 439, 442 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (noting that requiring the probation officer's physical presence 
during every probation search would unnecessarily interfere with the twin 
goals of probation: rehabilitation of the probationer and protection of 
society), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 
112, 121-22 (2001). 
Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence is denied. 
(R., pp.115-117 (footnotes omitted).) 
The state relies on the district court's well-reasoned and succinct ruling, as set 
forth above. Armstrong has failed to show any error in the district court's analysis and 
conclusion that, under the dictionary definition of "agent," the police officers were acting 
as agents of the parole officer when they searched Armstrong's vehicle pursuant to the 
parole officer's authorization. 
E. The Parole Search Was Justified By Reasonable Suspicion That Armstrong Was 
In Violation Of His Parole 
Even without Armstrong's signed conditions of parole, the search of his vehicle 
by police officers was justified. 
Parolees and probationers enjoy a reduced expectation of privacy against 
governmental intrusion. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006); United States v. 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001 ). The United States Supreme Court has held that 
probationers and parolees, due to their status as such, have a diminished expectation of 
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privacy for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 
1 ). The Idaho Supreme Court recognized this same diminished expectation of 
privacy in State v. Gawron,112 Idaho 841,843,736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987), stating: 
"persons conditionally released to societies have a reduced expectation of privacy, 
thereby rendering intrusions by government authorities 'reasonable' which otherwise 
would be unreasonable or invalid under traditional constitutional concepts." Applying 
this principle to the police search of Armstrong's vehicle -- at the request of the parole 
officer -- supports the conclusion that the search was not unconstitutional. The 
Supreme Court's opinion in Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), is instructive. 
In Samson, the Court "granted certiorari to decide whether a suspicionless 
search, conducted under the authority [of a statute authorizing a search without a 
warrant or probable cause], violates the Constitution." 547 U.S. at 846. The Court held 
"it does not." kt In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted its prior conclusion in 
Knights that probationers and parolees have a diminished expectation of privacy. Id. at 
847-849. The Court reasoned: 
As we noted in Knights, parolees are on the "continuum" of state-
imposed punishments. On this continuum, parolees have fewer 
expectations of privacy than probationers, because parole is more akin to 
imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment. As this Court has 
pointed out, parole is an established variation on imprisonment of 
convicted criminals . . .. The essence of parole is release from prison, 
before the completion of sentence, on the condition that the prisoner abide 
by certain rules during the balance of the sentence. In most cases, the 
State is willing to extend parole only because it is able to condition it upon 
compliance with certain requirements. 
The extent and reach of [California's) parole conditions clearly 
demonstrate that parolees ... have severely diminished expectations of 
privacy by virtue of their status alone. 
14 
547 U.S. at 850 (citations and quotations omitted). 
Based upon a parolee's reduced expectation of privacy and the state's interests 
in the ability to regulate those released on parole, the Court in Samson concluded that 
"[i]mposing a reasonable suspicion requirement" on the ability to search a parolee 
"would give parolees greater opportunity to anticipate searches and conceal criminality." 
Samson, 547 U.S. at 854. Accordingly, the Court held "that the Fourth Amendment 
does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee." 
kl at 856. 
Although Samson involved actions taken pursuant to a statute that permitted 
suspicionless searches, the holding of the case stands for the broader proposition that 
such searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment. 547 U.S. at 856. It logically 
follows from this holding that police officers could do precisely what they did in this case 
without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment, i.e., search the vehicle belonging to 
Armstrong, who was on parole, without any suspicion whatsoever. Indeed, police 
officers exceeded this minimum standard by virtue of their knowledge that Armstrong 
was, as reported by his mother, under the influence of methamphetamine and talking 
about her being dead. Armstrong was in violation of his parole by apparently being 
under the influence of methamphetamine, thereby providing a reasonable basis, if not a 
"reasonable suspicion," for searching his vehicle. 
Because the search of Armstrong's vehicle was constitutionally permissible, he 
has failed to show he is entitled to suppression of any evidence found as a result of that 
search. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Armstrong's conviction. 
DATED this 1 fh day of July, 2014. 
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